How should we understand the relationship between the study of the history of African--American political thought and the current practice of antiracist critical theory, a philosophical but equally interdisciplinary enterprise that aims to advance the cause of racial justice? In In the Shadow of Du Bois (Gooding--Williams, 2009), a book that focuses on the political thought of W.E.B.
that relation that references inquiry into the history African American political thought, the normative concerns of antiracist critical theory, and the study of one of Du Bois's essays. Finally, I recur to Shadow's interpretations of Du Bois and Douglass, which I adduce to show how the study of the history of African American political thought can contribute to the project of antiracist critical theory.
The History of Philosophy and Current Practices of Philosophy
Published in 1984, Philosophy in History (Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner, 1984) is an anthology co--edited by Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner. In the anthology's introduction, its editors frame their analysis of the relation between the ongoing practice of philosophy and the study of philosophy's history with reference to a dispute between, on one hand, intellectual historians who charge analytic philosophers writing the history of philosophy Capen Lecture Series 3 with anachronism, claiming that they read "current [philosophical] interests back into the past,"
and, on the other hand, analytic philosophers who charge intellectual historians with antiquarianism, accusing them of "'not getting at the philosophical point'." Responding to this dispute, the editors suggest that we forget the "bugbears" of anachronism and antiquarianism, insisting that " [i] f to be anachronistic is to link a past X to a present Y rather than studying it in isolation, then every historian is always anachronistic,"----adding that "conversely, if to be antiquarian is to study X without regard to… [contemporary] concerns, nobody has ever succeeded in being antiquarian." Considering just this suggestion, one might very well conclude that Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner mean to side with analytic philosophers against the intellectual historians, because, they propose, anachronism is inevitable, antiquarianism impossible. But that would be the wrong conclusion to draw, for the pivotal point of their argument is to refocus the intellectual historian's critique. Insisting that "'[a]nachronism' is…not the right charge to make," the editors of Philosophy in History claim that the analytic philosopher's approach to the history of philosophy goes astray, not because it is anachronistic, but because it is anachronistic in the wrong way; that is, because it approaches the history of philosophy in the spirit of a pre--Kuhnian view of the history of the hard sciences, according to which "questions do not change, but answers do." By contrast, the editors argue, the major task of a Kuhnian "historian of a scientific discipline is to understand when and why the questions changed. The principle defect of the kind of history of philosophy to which analytic philosophy has given rise is its lack of interest in the rise and fall of questions." In order to throw into sharper relief the issues raised by the introduction to Philosophy in History, I turn to two of Daniel Garber's essays (Garber, 1989; Garber, 2001 and the positions we should take, or illustrations of dead ends we should avoid" (p.14). But, according to Garber, Bennett's approach to the history of philosophy courts danger. First, because regarding the history of philosophy "as contributing to the discovery of philosophical truth, we are led to emphasize those portions of a philosopher's work that speak to our interests, that address our conception of where philosophical truth is to be found leaving other aspects of the work aside."
And second, because our interest in philosophical truth often leads us to reconstruct an historical figure's position "in terms that make sense of it to our philosophical sensibilities, whether or not the reformulation captures anything the philosopher himself would have acknowledged." In both cases Garber worries that "the focus on philosophical truth distorts our historical understanding of the figure and his position" (pp.16--17) .
Capen Lecture Series 5 Garber insists that, while his discussion of Bennett's approach to the history of philosophy sounds like a criticism, it is not, for "if our goal is philosophical truth, then historical veracity can have only instrumental value at best; it is of value only insofar as it helps us attain our principal goal." Notwithstanding this disclaimer, it is difficult not to notice the affinity between Garber's description of the use of the history of philosophy that Bennett exemplifies and Rorty's, Schneewind's and Skinner's explicitly critical description of the use of the history of philosophy that the analytic philosopher who is anachronistic in the wrong way exemplifies. For what both descriptions depict is an approach that judges the writings of philosophers past to merit serious attention only if they express insights that bear on the interest of present--day philosophers in discovering the correct answers to questions having philosophical currency.
It is also difficult not to notice the affinity between the alternative to Bennett's approach that Garber proposes and the alternative to wrongly conceived anachronism that Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner advance. For contrasting his method-what he characterizes as "disinterested" history of philosophy-to Bennett's, Garber writes that "Bennett's history of philosophy seeks philosophical truth, answers to philosophical questions…[while] mine seeks the questions themselves." Declining, again, to criticize Bennett, and avoiding the adversarial attitude animating the introduction to Philosophy in History, Garber concludes that " [w] e cannot ignore the ways in which past thinkers are involved in projects similar to ours…At the same time, we cannot ignore the ways in which they differ from us…the way in which they ask different questions and make different assumptions. Both are important to a genuine historical understanding of the philosophical past, but just as important, we as philosophers can learn from both."
In "What's Philosophical about the History of Philosophy" (Garber, 2005 Brandom's de dicto readings correspond roughly to Garber's antiquarian history of philosophy, and his de re readings to a philosophical truth--seeking approach to the history of philosophy that Brandom, like Garber, associates with Jonathan Bennett. Perhaps Garber's 1989 essay and Rorty's, Schneewind's, and Skinner's introduction helped to begin the shift from one approach to the other, and perhaps the new insistence with which Garber later advances his cause reflects that shift-which he himself helped to initiate.
Whereas Garber (1989 Garber ( /2001 first mounts a largely epistemic argument for the disinterested history of philosophy, proposing that his approach contributes to historical understanding and philosophical learning, he later (Garber, 2005) more radically implies that disinterested, antiquarian history can do two things: 1) bring to light alternative ("fresh") ways to conceptualize philosophy; and 2) effectively alienate and distance us from the contemporary practice of philosophy-what I take him to mean when he writes of freeing ourselves from the tyranny of the present. It is with an eye to the possibility that work in the history of philosophy can have effects of these sorts that I should now like to consider an essay by Charles Taylor. Taylor's "Philosophy and its history" (Taylor, 1984) is the lead essay in the Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner volume, and, while Taylor never mentions Kuhn, his talk of "paradigms"
and "models" suggests a broadly Kuhnian picture of the history of philosophy. Unlike the volume's coeditors, however, Taylor is less interested to point out the defects in a particular way of writing the history of philosophy than he is to establish the central importance to philosophical criticism of genetic accounts of our philosophical models.
Capen Lecture Series 8 For Taylor, the history of philosophy is, to a large extent, the history of philosophical models. What defines a model is a "cluster of assumptions," such as the cluster of assumptions that define one of Taylor's favorite examples, the "epistemological model." Taylor explains his concept of the epistemological model in many places, but in the essay in question limits himself to stating that it understands our awareness of the world "in terms of our forming representationsbe they ideas in the mind, states of the brain, sentences we accept or whatever-of 'external' reality."
One critical premise of Taylor's argument is that our practices-including "our manner of doing natural science…our technology…some at least of the dominant ways in which we construe political life….
[and] our ways of healing, regimenting, organizing people in society"-embed philosophical models. Extrapolating to non--scientific practices Kuhn's idea (see Kuhn, 2012 ) that the practice of normal science is rooted in a scientific community's common commitments, the shared constellation of assumptions, theories, techniques, and so forth that Kuhn called a "paradigm" but later a "disciplinary matrix," Taylor holds that a wide range of our practices may well embed a single model as their organizing principle. Another important premise is that we tend to accept as unquestionable and too obviously true to mention the models that our practices have come to embed, so that it becomes quite difficult "to see what an alternative would look like."
From these premises Taylor argues that, to liberate ourselves from the presumption that an embedded model provides a uniquely intelligible interpretation of some subject matter-with respect to the epistemological model, a uniquely intelligible interpretation of mind--in--the--worldwe require a genetic account of that model: that is, an account that retrieves the formulations through which the embedding in practice initially took place. Thus, the philosophical criticism of the epistemological model requires that one return to Descartes, for "if one wants to be able to see Capen Lecture Series 9 this model no longer just as the contour map of the way things obviously are with the mind--in--the--world, but as one option among others, then a first step is to see it as something one could come to espouse out of a creative description, something one could give reasons for. And this you get by retrieving the foundational formulations" (pp.19--20) .
Like Garber, Taylor thinks that the study of the history of philosophy can effectively distance and alienate us from inherited philosophical models, and, as a result, help us to begin both to appreciate alternatives to these models and to take seriously the "new issue [s] " that these alternatives seem to raise. Notice, however, that Taylor reverses the causal order that Garber's remarks suggest. For Garber, antiquarian history of philosophy, precisely because it affords the philosopher fresh views of her or his subject matter, can help to liberate her or him from the tyranny of the present. But this emancipatory strategy is not likely to be effective, Taylor suggests, if the fresh views adduced by the antiquarian "look bizarre and inconceivable." And they will look bizarre and inconceivable, he argues, unless the philosopher has already taken up a distanced and critical stance towards the inherited models that, "captured in the force field of common sense," he otherwise accepts as unquestionable. I have dwelt on Charles Taylor's contribution to the Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner volume, for, as I detail below, it corresponds to the approach to Du Bois I take in Shadow.
Before Races" (see Bernasconi, 2009; Jeffers, 2013; and Du Bois, 1997) , arguing that Bernasconi's and Jeffers's readings of Du Bois effectively break with an entrenched scholarly tendency to treat "Conservation" first and foremost as an extended philosophical reflection on the concept of race.
On P. Taylor's account, Bernasconi's and Jeffers's articles are best appreciated against the backdrop of what he dubs "The Du Bois Debates, " by which he refers a) to K. Anthony Appiah's defense of racial eliminativism by way of an interpretation of "Conservation" in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Appiah, 1992) ; b) to a number of conference papers and published essays that, thereafter, critically responded to Appiah's interpretation of "Conservation"; and c) to Appiah's rejoinder to these criticisms, which, P. Taylor writes, "satisfied everyone, more or less," due to the distinction Appiah drew between race and racial identity. Appiah's interpretation of "Conservation" initially drew attention because it used Du Bois's essay forcefully to defend the core eliminativist thesis that we should abandon race--talk for the reason that there are no races.
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The debates about Appiah's Du Bois interpretation waned when Appiah conceded that racial identities exist, even if races do not (Appiah, 1996) Bernasconi and Jeffers respond to the Du Bois debates, P. Taylor notes, by charging them with presentism (Bernasconi more explicitly than Jeffers) -that is, by stressing that they "overlooked the distance between Du Bois's actual preoccupations and our own," thus missing an and anti--anti--racist politics on the ground was, for some partisans to the early Du Bois debates, precisely the issue." For these partisans, Taylor explains, the disturbing issue raised by Appiah's reading of Du Bois was that racial eliminativism seemed to reinforce the conservative arguments for color--blindness that tended to animate anti--anti--racist politics.
Ultimately, P. Taylor suggests that we should not reject presentist readings of "Conservation," or, for that matter, of any other contributions to the history of African American political thought, for presentist and historicist readings can complement one another, a position that echoes Garber's 1989 essay. "It is important to get Du Bois right, to restore him to his Capen Lecture Series 12
context," P. Taylor insists. "But is also important," he continues "to remember that he was trying to solve certain problems…and that if he were around today he would probably be keen to apply his prior self's hard--won insights to contemporary questions"(p. 381). A valuable moral of P.
Taylor's argument is that the interests and purposes of the interpreter typically drive the interpretations of received texts, and that the identification of those interests and purposes can help to clarify both the conflict and the complementarity of alternative interpretations.
Gooding--Williams: In the Shadow of Du Bois
Returning now to Shadow, two broad purposes shaped the argument of that book. (Gooding-Williams, 2009 ). In addition, Du Bois's philosophical authority had been so compelling and far reaching that it had tended to overshadow and foreclose potentially fruitful, alternative possibilities for understanding black politics. The point of reconstructing Du Bois's philosophical response to Jim
Crow was explicitly to grasp the conceptual and normative commitments shaping his early thought as elements of a coherent argument. In a related vein, the point of turning to Bondage was to recover for post-Jim Crow African American political theory possibilities for understanding black politics that the force of Du Bois's philosophical authority has tended to obscure.
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To return to C. Taylor-that is, to restate Shadow's reconstructive agenda in C. Taylor's idiomthe primary purpose of my book was to advance a genetic account of the young Du Bois's political theoretical model of black politics; that is, to retrieve his foundational, creative redescription of black politics, for which he could and did give reasons. I thought it was important to retrieve that model, because it seemed to me that, over time, our practices of construing and envisioning the possibilities available to black political life-and here I meant especially to include the practice of post-Jim Crow
African-American political thought-had come to embed a number of unquestioned and difficult to question assumptions that echoed the writings of the young Du Bois.
To be sure, my point was not to suggest that the theoretical richness of Du Bois's oeurvre, early or late, could be reduced to these assumptions. Rather it was to highlight their centrality, to show how and why, despite some tensions between them, they appeared to hang together, and to gain some distance from them-at least enough distance to begin to regard them as optional. Like C. Taylor, but unlike Garber, it seemed to me that, to loosen the grip of Du Bois's early response to Jim Crow on African-American political thought and activism, and to begin to take seriously historical alternativesthat is, to begin to regard historical alternatives not as bizarre, but as plausible and as deserving consideration-it was initially necessary to engage Du Bois's thought on its own terms. Once engaged, it seemed reasonable critically to consider Du Bois's thought in the perspective of one of those alternatives-Douglass's Bondage-and to bring the thought of both thinkers to bear in evaluating contemporary contributions to African-American political theory (again, this was Shadow's second, broad purpose).
Here, the purpose of my argument was not, as K. Anthony Appiah (2011) suggests in a review of Shadow, simply to "counterpose" Du Bois's errors to Douglass's insights; rather it was to consider contemporary African American political theory in a new light-that is, in the perspective of an account Gooding--Williams, 2009 ). I doubt that Douglass would avow that presupposition. Still, I am committed to the claim that politics can be so conceptualized, and that Bondage depicts Douglass's plantation politics as ruler--less action--in--concert.
In sum, then, and in keeping with P. Taylor's insight that historicist and presentist readings can be productively combined-that they can complement one another-the argument and ideology critique that I advance in Shadow show that readings of both sorts can fruitfully expand both the study of the history of African--American political thought and our sense of the possibilities available to black politics.
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Conclusion: History and Antiracist Critical Theory
The sweep of contemporary contributions to antiracist critical theory is extensive, and includes expansive genealogical and critical historical accounts of modern racism; astute conceptual analyses of the interplay of racial and gender oppression; systematic explanations of the roles that policing, prison growth, and segregation play in perpetuating racial inequality; and nuanced appraisals of recent black politics-including the "Black Lives Matter" movement. Not all these efforts take up the history of Afro--modern or African--American political thought, but many do, and when they do they typically complicate our understanding of the relationship between the issues that engage contemporary critical theorists and the issues that engaged some of their predecessors (Dotson 2013; Sundstrom, 2008; Shelby, 2005; Gooding--Williams, 2009 ). When they do not, we may well find that these efforts reflect an overly narrow range of philosophical and political imagination (Scott, 2012; Taylor, 2013b) .
